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Abstract—Regression models, which are widely used from engineering applications to financial forecasting, are vulnerable to targeted
malicious attacks such as training data poisoning, through which adversaries can manipulate their predictions. Previous works that
attempt to address this problem rely on assumptions about the nature of the attack/attacker or overestimate the knowledge of the
learner, making them impractical. We introduce a novel Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID) based measure called N-LID that measures
the local deviation of a given data point’s LID with respect to its neighbors. We then show that N-LID can distinguish poisoned samples
from normal samples and propose an N-LID based defense approach that makes no assumptions of the attacker. Through extensive
numerical experiments with benchmark datasets, we show that the proposed defense mechanism outperforms the state of the art
defenses in terms of prediction accuracy (up to 76% lower MSE compared to an undefended ridge model) and running time.
Index Terms—poisoning attack, linear regression, local intrinsic dimensionality, supervised learning
F
1 INTRODUCTION
L INEAR regression models are a fundamental class ofsupervised learning, with applications in healthcare,
business, security, and engineering [1], [2], [3], [4]. Recent
works in the literature show that the performance of re-
gression models degrades significantly in the presence of
poisoned training data [5], [6], [7]. Through such attacks,
adversaries attempt to force the learner to end up with a
prediction model with impaired prediction capabilities. Any
application that relies on regression models for automated
decision making could potentially be compromised and
make decisions that could have serious consequences.
For example, as demonstrated by Vrablecova´ et al. [4],
regression models can be used for forecasting the power
load in a smart electrical grid. In such a setting, if an
adversary compromises that forecasting system and forces it
to predict a lower power demand than the expected power
demand for a particular period, the power supplied during
that period would be insufficient and may cause blackouts.
Conversely, if the adversary forces the forecasting system to
predict a higher power demand than the expected demand,
there would be surplus power generated that may overload
the power distribution system.
In practice, such attacks can take place in situations
where the attacker has an opportunity to introduce poisoned
samples to the training process. For example, this can occur
when data is collected using crowd-sourcing marketplaces,
where organizations build data sets with the help of individ-
uals whose authenticity cannot be guaranteed. Due to the
size and complexity of datasets, the sponsoring organization
may not be able to extensively validate the quality of all
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data/labels. Therefore, to address this problem, defense
mechanisms that take adversarial perturbations into account
need to be embedded into regression models.
Although adversarial manipulations pose a significant
threat to critical applications of regression, only a few
previous studies have attempted to address this problem.
Most works in the literature are related to robust regression,
where regression models are trained in the presence of
stochastic noise instead of maliciously poisoned data [8],
[9]. Recently, however, several works have presented linear
regression models that consider the presence of adversarial
data samples. Jagielski et al. [5] and Liu et al. [6] present two
such defense models that iteratively exclude data samples
with the largest residuals from the training process. How-
ever, both require the learner to be aware of the number
of normal samples in the training dataset, which can be
considered as an overestimation of the learner’s knowledge,
making them impractical.
Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID) is a metric known
for its capability to characterize adversarial examples [10],
[11]. LID has been applied for detecting adversarial samples
in Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) [12] and as a mechanism
to reduce the effect of noisy labels for training DNNs [13].
In this paper, we propose a novel LID-based defense mech-
anism that weights each training sample based on the like-
lihood of them being normal samples or poisoned samples.
The resulting weight vector can then be used in conjunction
with any linear regression model that supports a weighted
loss function (e.g., weighted linear least squares function).
Therefore the proposed defense mechanism can be used to
make learners such as ridge regression, LASSO regression,
elastic-net regression, and neural network regression (NNR)
resilient against poisoning attacks.
We first introduce a novel LID measure called Neigh-
borhood LID ratio (N-LID) that measures the local deviation
of a particular sample’s LID with respect to its k nearest
neighbors. Therefore N-LID can identify regions with simi-
lar LID values and samples that have significantly different
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2LID values than their neighbors. We then show that N-LID
values of poisoned and normal samples have two distin-
guishable distributions and introduce a baseline weighting
mechanism based on the likelihood ratio of each data sam-
ple’s N-LID (i.e., how many times more likely that the N-
LID value is from the N-LID distribution of normal samples
than the N-LID distribution of poisoned samples). Although
the learners’ capabilities are exaggerated, this paves the way
for another N-LID based weighting scheme that assumes
no knowledge of the attacker or the attacked samples. The
latter defense has up to 76% lower mean squared error
(MSE) compared to an undefended ridge model, without the
increased computational costs associated with prior works.
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Fig. 1: A representation of the SDR listeners (blue), civilians
(green) and rogue agents (red) in OMNET++ simulator.
As a real-world application of the proposed defense
algorithm, we consider the following security application
in the communications domain as a case study. Software-
defined radios (SDRs) with considerable computing and
networking capabilities can be utilized as an inexpensive
scanner array for distributed detection of transmissions
(Figure 1). Based on the captured transmission signals, the
transmission sources are assigned a risk value τ ∈ [0, 1],
based on the probability of them being malicious transmis-
sion sources (i.e., rogue agent). To clarify, background radio
traffic (e.g., civilians) would have a τ value closer to zero,
and a transmission source identified as a rogue agent would
have a τ value closer to one. Due to the widespread presence
of encryption methods, the risk association for transmission
sources has to be inferred based on their statistical charac-
teristics, without considering the transmitted information.
The task of assigning a risk value can be formulated as
a regression problem where the learner creates an estimator
based on data collected from known transmission sources.
However, if the rogue agents deliberately try to mask their
activities by altering their transmission patterns during the
initial deployment of the SDR network (i.e., when the data
is collected for training), they may force the learner to learn
an estimator that is compromised (poisoning attack). There-
fore, to prevent the estimator from being compromised, the
learner uses a defense algorithm during the training phase.
In Section 6.1, we present details of the simulation setup
followed by empirical results demonstrating the usefulness
of our proposed defense.
The main contributions of this work are:
1) A novel LID measure called Neighborhood LID ratio
that takes into account the LID values of a sample’s
k nearest neighbors.
2) An N-LID based defense mechanism that makes no
assumptions regarding the attack, yet can be used in
conjunction with several existing learners such as ridge,
LASSO and NNR.
3) Extensive numerical experiments that show N-LID
weighted regression models provide significant resis-
tance against poisoning attacks compared to state of the
art alternatives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides details of previous literature relevant
to this work. Section 3 formally defines the problem being
addressed followed by Section 4, where we introduce the
defense algorithms. We then describe the existing attacks
against regression models in Section 5. Section 6 includes
a detailed empirical analysis of the attacks and defenses
on several real-world datasets followed by the results and
discussion. The concluding remarks of Section 7 conclude
the paper.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we briefly review the relevant previous work
in the literature.
2.1 Robust regression
In robust statistics, robust regression is well studied to
devise estimators that are not strongly affected by the
presence of noise and outliers [14]. Huber [15] uses a
modified loss function that optimizes the squared loss for
relatively small errors and absolute loss for relatively large
ones. As the influence on absolute loss by outliers is less
compared to squared loss, this reduces their effect on the
optimization problem, thereby resulting in a less distorted
estimator. Mangasarian and Musicant [9] solve the Huber
M-estimator problem by reducing it to a quadratic program,
thereby improving its performance. The TheilSen estimator,
developed by Thiel [16] and Sen [17] uses the median of
pairwise slopes as an estimator of the slope parameter of
the regression model. As the median is a robust measure
that is not influenced by outliers, the resulting regression
model is considered to be robust as well.
Fischler and Bolles [18] introduced random sample con-
sensus (RANSAC), which iteratively trains an estimator us-
ing a randomly sampled subset of the training data. At each
iteration, the algorithm identifies data samples that do not
fit the trained model by a predefined threshold as outliers.
The remaining data samples (i.e., inliers) are considered as
part of the consensus set. The process is repeated a fixed
number of times, replacing the currently accepted model
if a refined model with a larger consensus set is found.
Huang et al. [8] decomposes the noisy data in to clean data
and outliers by formulating an optimization problem. The
estimator parameters are then computed using the clean
data.
While these methods provide robustness guarantees
against noise and outliers, we focus on malicious per-
turbations by sophisticated attackers that craft adversarial
samples that are similar to normal data. Moreover, the
aforementioned classical robust regression methods may
3fail in high dimensional settings as outliers might not be
distinctive in that space due to high-dimensional noise [19].
2.2 Adversarial regression
The problem of learning under adversarial conditions has
inspired a wide range of research from the machine learning
community, see the work of Liu et al. [20] for a survey.
Although adversarial learning in classification and anomaly
detection has received a lot of attention [21], [22], [23], [24],
adversarial regression remains relatively unexplored.
Most works in adversarial regression provide perfor-
mance guarantees given several assumptions regarding the
training data and noise distribution hold. The resilient algo-
rithm by Chen et al. [25] assumes that the training data be-
fore adversarial perturbations, as well as the additive noise,
are sub-Gaussian and that training features are independent.
Feng et al. [26] provides a resilient algorithm for logistic
regression under similar assumptions.
Xiao et al. [7] examined how the parameters of the
hyperplane in a linear regression model change under
adversarial perturbations. The authors also introduced a
novel threat model against linear regression models. Liu
et al. [6] use robust PCA to transform the training data
to a lower-dimensional subspace and follow an iterative
trimmed optimization procedure where only the n samples
with the lowest residuals are used to train the model. Note
that n here is the number of normal samples in the training
data set. Jagielski et al. [5] use a similar approach for the al-
gorithm “TRIM”, where trimmed optimization is performed
in the input space itself. Therefore they do not assume a
low-rank feature matrix as done in [6]. Both approaches,
however, assume that the learner is aware of n (or at least
an upper bound for n), thereby reducing the practicality of
the algorithms.
Tong et al. [27] consider an attacker that perturbs data
samples during the test phase to induce incorrect predic-
tions. The authors use a single attacker, multiple learner
framework modeled as a multi-learner Stackelberg game.
Alfeld et al. [28] propose an optimal attack algorithm against
auto-regressive models for time series forecasting. In our
work, we consider poisoning attacks against models that
are used for interpolating instead of extrapolating. Nelson
et al. [29] originally introduced RONI (Reject On Negative
Impact) as a defense for adversarial attacks against classi-
fication models. In RONI, the impact of each data sample
on training is measured, and samples with notable negative
impacts are excluded from the training process.
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, no lin-
ear regression algorithm has been proposed that reduces
the effects of adversarial perturbations in training data
through the use of LID. Most existing works on adver-
sarial regression make strong assumptions regarding the
attacker/attack, making them impractical, whereas, we pro-
pose a novel defense that makes no such assumptions.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a linear regression learning problem in the
presence of a malicious adversary. Define the labeled pris-
tine training data (i.e., prior to adversarial perturbations)
as S := (X, y), where X ∈ Rn×d is the feature matrix and
y ∈ Rn×1 the corresponding response variable vector. We let
xi ∈ Rd×1 denote the ith training sample, associated with a
corresponding response variable yi ∈ R from y. Note that
each yi ∈ [0, 1] for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} unlike in classification
problems where the labels take discrete categorical values.
A linear regression model can be described by a linear
function of the form hθ(xi) = ωTxi + b that predicts the
response variable yˆi for each xi ∈ X . The function h is
parameterized by the vector θ = (ω, b) ∈ Rd+1 consisting of
the feature weights ω ∈ Rd and the bias of the hyperplane
b ∈ R. The parameter vector θ is obtained by applying a
learning algorithm, such as ridge regression (shown below),
on S:
θ∗ = arg min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
yi − hθ(xi)
)2
+ λ‖ω‖22. (1)
Note that λ is a regularization parameter.
The adversary’s goal is to maximize the regression
model’s prediction error for unseen data samples (i.e., test-
ing phase). To succeed in this, the adversary introduces a set
of poisoned data samples X¯ ∈ Rp×d and labels y¯ ∈ Rp×1
into the pristine training set S, resulting in a contaminated
training dataset S˜ := (X˜, y˜) where X˜ = X∪X¯ and y˜ = y∪y¯.
Applying a learning algorithm on the contaminated training
data would result in a compromised regression model as
follows,
θ˜ = arg min
θ
1
n+ p
n+p∑
i=1
(
yi − hθ(xi)
)2
+ λ‖ω‖22, (2)
where yi ∈ y˜ and xi ∈ X˜ . Through X¯ and y¯, the adversary
forces the learner to obtain a parameter vector θ˜ that is sig-
nificantly different from θ∗, which it would have obtained
had the training data been unaltered.
To address this problem, we propose an LID based
weighting scheme that can be incorporated into learning
algorithms that optimize quadratic loss functions such as
the Mean Squared Error in Equation (2). In weighted least
squares (WLS), a weight βi ∈ [0, 1] is assigned for each
sample in order to discriminate and vary their influence on
the optimization problem. A small βi value would allow for
a large residual value, and the effect of the sample would be
de-emphasized. Conversely, a large βi value would empha-
size that particular sample’s effect. The weighted regression
learning problem is formulated as the following convex
optimization problem:
θˆ = arg min
θ
1
n+ p
n+p∑
i=1
βi
(
yi − hθ(xi)
)2
+ λ‖ω‖22. (3)
By carefully selecting a weight vector β, the learner can
minimize the effects of the adversarial perturbations and
recover the correct estimator θˆ ≈ θ∗.
4 DEFENSE ALGORITHMS
First, we briefly introduce the theory of LID for assessing
the dimensionality of data subspaces, then, we present our
novel LID based mechanism to obtain the weight vector β
and show how it can easily be incorporated into existing
regression algorithms.
4Fig. 2: The left figure shows the distribution of data points
around the sample of interest (blue star) in a d-dimensional
Euclidean space. The right figure shows the corresponding
distribution of distance.
Expansion models of dimensionality have previously
been successfully employed in a wide range of applications,
such as manifold learning, dimension reduction, similarity
search, and anomaly detection [10], [30]. In this paper, we use
LID to characterize the intrinsic dimensionality of regions where
attacked samples lie, and create a weighting mechanism that de-
emphasizes the effect of samples that have a high likelihood of being
adversarial examples.
4.1 Theory of Local Intrinsic Dimensionality.
In the theory of intrinsic dimensionality, classical expansion
models measure the rate of growth in the number of data
samples encountered as the distance from the sample of
interest increases [10]. As an example, in Euclidean space,
the volume of an m-dimensional ball grows proportionally
to rm, when its size is scaled by a factor of r. From this rate
of change of volume w.r.t distance, the expansion dimension
m can be deduced as:
V2
V1
=
(
r2
r1
)m
⇒ m = ln (V2/V1)
ln (r2/r1)
. (4)
Transferring the concept of expansion dimension to
the statistical setting of continuous distance distributions
leads to the formal definition of LID. By substituting the
cumulative distance for volume, LID provides measures
of the intrinsic dimensionality of the underlying data
subspace. Refer to the work of Houle [10] for more details
concerning the theory of LID. The formal definition of LID
is given below [10].
Definition 1 (Local Intrinsic Dimensionality).
Given a data sample x ∈ X , let R > 0 be a random variable
denoting the distance from x to other data samples. If the cumula-
tive distribution function F (r) of R is positive and continuously
differentiable at distance r > 0, the LID of x at distance r is given
by:
LIDF (r) , lim→0
ln
(
F ((1 + ) · r)/F (r))
ln(1 + )
=
r · F ′(r)
F (r)
, (5)
whenever the limit exists.
The last equality of Equation (5) follows by applying
L’Hoˆpital’s rule to the limits [10]. The local intrinsic dimen-
sion at x is in turn defined as the limit when the radius r
tends to zero:
LIDF = limr→0 LIDF (r). (6)
LIDF describes the relative rate at which its cumulative
distribution function F (r) increases as the distance r
increases from 0 (Figure 2). In the ideal case where the
data in the vicinity of x is distributed uniformly within
a subspace, LIDF equals the dimension of the subspace;
however, in practice these distributions are not ideal,
the manifold model of data does not perfectly apply,
and LIDF is not an integer [12]. Nevertheless, the local
intrinsic dimensionality is an indicator of the dimension
of the subspace containing x that would best fit the data
distribution in the vicinity of x.
Definition 2 (Estimation of LID).
Given a reference sample x ∼ P , where P represents the data
distribution, the Maximum Likelihood Estimator of the LID at x
is defined as follows [30]:
L̂ID(x) = −
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
log
ri(x)
rmax(x)
)−1
. (7)
Here, ri(x) denotes the distance between x and its i-th nearest
neighbor within a sample of k points drawn from P , and rmax(x)
is the maximum of the neighbor distances.
The above estimation assumes that samples are drawn
from a tight neighborhood, in line with its development
from Extreme Value Theory. In practice, the sample set is
drawn uniformly from the available training data (omitting
x itself), which itself is presumed to have been randomly
drawn from P . Note that the LID defined in Equation (6) is
the theoretical calculation, and that L̂ID defined in Equation
(7) is its estimate.
4.2 Neighborhood LID Ratio.
We now introduce a novel LID based measure called neigh-
borhood LID ratio (N-LID) and discuss the intuition behind
using N-LID to identify adversarial samples during training.
By perturbing the feature vector, the adversary moves a
training sample away from the distribution of normal sam-
ples. Computing LID estimates with respect to its neighbor-
hood would then reveal an anomalous distribution of the
local distance to these neighbors. Furthermore, as L̂ID(x) is
an indicator of the dimension of the subspace that contains
x, by comparing the LID estimate of a data sample to the
LID estimates of its nearest neighbors, we can identify re-
gions that have a similar lower-dimensional subspace. More
importantly, any samples that have a substantially different
lower-dimensional subspace compared to its neighbors can
be identified as poisoned samples.
Considering this aspect of poisoning attacks, we propose
a novel LID ratio measure that has similar properties as the
local outlier factor (LOF) algorithm introduced by Breunig
et al. [31] as follows:
Definition 3 (Neighborhood LID ratio).
Given a data sample x ∈ X , the neighborhood LID ratio of x is
defined as:
N-LID(x) =
1
k
∑k
i=1 L̂ID(xi)
L̂ID(x)
. (8)
Here, L̂ID(xi) denotes the LID estimate of the i-th near-
est neighbor from the k nearest neighbors of x. Figure 3a
shows the LID estimates of a poisoned sample and its k
nearest neighbors. As the poisoned sample’s LID estimate is
5substantially different from its neighbors, the N-LID value
calculated using Equation(8) highlights it as an outlier. As
Figure 3b shows, N-LID is a powerful metric that can give
two distinguishable distributions for poisoned and normal
samples. Although ideally, we like to see no overlap be-
tween the two distributions, in real-world datasets, we see
some degree of overlap.
4.3 Baseline Defense.
We now describe a baseline weighting scheme calculated
using the N-LID distributions of poisoned and normal sam-
ples. Define pn and pa as the probability density functions
of the N-LID values of normal samples and poisoned sam-
ples. For a given data sample xi with the N-LID estimate
N-LID(xi), we define two possible hypotheses, Hn and Ha
as
Hn : N-LID(xi) ∼ pn,
Ha : N-LID(xi) ∼ pa, (9)
where the notation “N-LID(xi) ∼ p” denotes the condition
“N-LID(xi) is from the distribution p”. To clarify, Hn is the
hypothesis that N-LID(xi) is from the N-LID distribution of
normal samples and Ha is the hypothesis that N-LID(xi) is
from the N-LID distribution of poisoned samples.
The likelihood ratio (LR) is usually used in statistics to
compare the goodness of fit of two statistical models. We
define the likelihood ratio of a data sample xi with the N-
LID estimate N-LID(xi) as
Λ
(
N-LID(xi)
)
= pn
(
N-LID(xi)
)
/pa
(
N-LID(xi)
)
, (10)
where p(N-LID(xi)) denotes the probability of the N-LID
of sample xi w.r.t the probability distribution p. To clarify,
Λ(N-LID(xi)) expresses how many times more likely it is
that N-LID(xi) is under the N-LID distribution of normal
samples than the N-LID distribution of poisoned samples.
As there is a high possibility for pn and pa to have an
overlapping region (Figure 3b), there is a risk of empha-
sizing the importance of (giving a higher weight to) poi-
soned samples. To mitigate that risk, we only de-emphasize
samples that are suspected to be poisoned (i.e., low LR
values). Therefore, we transform the LR values such that
Λ(N-LID(x)) ∈ [0, 1]. The upper bound is set to 1 to prevent
overemphasizing samples.
Subsequently, we fit a hyperbolic tangent function to the
transformed LR values (z) in the form of 0.5(1− tanh(az −
b)) and obtain suitable values for the parameters a and
b. The scalar value of 0.5 maintains the scale and vertical
position of the function between 0 and 1. By fitting a smooth
function to the LR values, we remove the effect of noise and
enable the calculation of weights for future training samples.
Finally, we use the N-LID value of each xi and use Equation
(11) to obtain its corresponding weight βi.
βi = 0.5
(
1− tanh(aN-LID(xi)− b)
)
. (11)
4.4 Attack Unaware Defense.
The LR based weighting scheme described above assigns
weights to training samples based on the probabilities of
their N-LID values. This approach requires the learner to
be aware of the probability density functions (PDFs) of
normal and poisoned samples. The two distributions can be
obtained by simulating an attack and deliberately altering
a subset of data during training, by assuming the distri-
butions based on domain knowledge or prior experience
or by having an expert identify attacked and non-attacked
samples in a subset of the dataset. However, we see that
the N-LID measure in Equation (8) results in larger values
for poisoned samples compared to normal samples (Figure
3b). In general, therefore, it seems that a weighting scheme
that assigns small weights to large N-LID values and large
weights to small N-LID values would lead to an estimator
that is less affected by the poisoned samples present in
training data.
Considering this aspect of N-LID, we choose three
weighting mechanisms that assign β = 1 for the sample
with the smallest N-LID and β = 0 for the sample with
the largest N-LID as shown in Figure 4. Note that there is
a trade-off between preserving normal samples, and pre-
venting poisoned samples from influencing the learner. The
concave weight function attempts to preserve normal sam-
ples, which causes poisoned samples to affect the learner
as well. In contrast, the convex weight function reduces the
impact of poisoned samples while reducing the influence
of many normal samples in the process. The linear weight
function assigns weights for intermediate N-LID values
linearly without considering the trade-off.
We obtain the weight functions by first scaling the N-
LID values of the training samples to [0, 1]. Take vi as the
scaled N-LID value of sample xi. Then, for the linear weight
function, we take βi = 1/vi as the weight. For the concave
weight function we use βi = 1 − v2i and for the convex
weight function we use βi = 1 − (2vi − v2i )0.5. We choose
these two arbitrary functions as they possess the trade-off
mentioned in the paragraph above. Any other functions that
have similar characteristics can also be used to obtain the
weights.
The main advantage of our proposed defense is that it
is decoupled from the learner; it can be used in conjunc-
tion with any learner that allows the loss function to be
weighted. In Section 6, we demonstrate the effectiveness
of our proposed defense by incorporating it into a ridge
regression model and an NNR model.
The high level procedures used to obtain uninfluenced
ridge regression models under adversarial conditions are
formalized in Algorithms 1 and 2 for the baseline defense
(N-LID LR) and the convex weight function based defense
(N-LID CVX).
5 THREAT MODELS
In this work, we assume a learner that does not have access
to a collection of pristine data samples. The training data
it uses may or may not be manipulated by an adversary.
The learner chooses its defense algorithm and regression
model, without knowing details of the attack employed by
the adversary.
The attacks being considered are white-box attacks, with
the attacker knowing the pristine training data and any
hyper-parameters of the learning algorithm. While these
assumptions exaggerate the capabilities of a real-world
attacker, it allows us to test the performance of defense
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Algorithm 1 N-LID LR Defense Algorithm
1: input S˜ = (X˜, y˜) . contaminated training data
2: output uninfluenced ridge regression model
3: initialize N-LIDa,N-LIDn,Λ, β = [ ]
4: N-LIDa ← n-lid-calculation(S˜) . calculate n-lid values of
poisoned samples
5: N-LIDn ← n-lid-calculation(S˜) . calculate n-lid values of
normal samples
6: Λ← calculate likelihood ratio for each N-LID value
7: fit function g(z) = 0.5(1− tanh(az− b)) to Λ to find a and b
8: β ← g(N-LID(x)) . obtain weight βi of each xi ∈ X using
the N-LID of xi
9: N-LID LR ridge = train-weighted-ridge-model(X˜, y˜, β)
algorithms under a worst-case scenario. Moreover, relying
on secrecy for security is considered as a poor practice when
designing defense algorithms [32].
We employ the attack algorithm introduced by Jagielski
et al. [5] against linear regression models, which is an
adaptation of the attack algorithm by Xiao et al. [7]. The
latter attack algorithm is used in prior works on adversarial
regression as the threat model [6]. While giving a brief
description of the attack algorithm, we refer the readers to
[5] for more details.
Algorithm 2 N-LID CVX Defense Algorithm
1: input S˜ = (X˜, y˜) . contaminated training data
2: output uninfluenced ridge regression model
3: initialize N-LID, v, β = [ ]
4: N-LID← n-lid-calculation(S˜) . calculate n-lid values of all
samples
5: v ← scaler(N-LID) . scale the N-LID values to [0, 1]
6: β ← 1− (2v − v2)0.5. obtain weight βi of each xi using the
chosen convex function
7: N-LID CVX ridge = train-weighted-ridge-model(X˜, y˜, β)
The underlying idea is to move selected data samples
along the direction that maximally increases the MSE of the
estimator on a pristine validation set. Unlike in classification
problems, the attacker can alter the response variable y as
well. We use similar values used by Jagielski et al. [5] for
the hyper-parameters that control the gradient step and
convergence of the iterative search procedure of the attack
algorithm. The line search learning rate (η), which controls
the step size taken in the direction of the gradient, is selected
from a set of predefined values by evaluating the MSE
values on a validation set.
The amount of poisoning is controlled by the poisoning
rate, defined as p/(p+ n), where n is the number of pristine
samples, and p is the number of poisoned samples. The
attacker is allowed to poison up to 20% of the training data
in line with prior works in the literature [5], [7].
The Opt attack algorithm selects the initial set of data
points to poison randomly from the training set. The corre-
sponding response variables y¯ are initialized in one of two
methods: (i) y¯ = 1 − y and (ii) y¯ = round(1 − y). The first
approach, known as Inverse Flipping (IFlip), results in a less
intense attack compared to the latter, known as Boundary
Flipping (BFlip), which pushes the response values to the
extreme edges. In our experiments, we test against attacks
that use both initialization techniques.
We also considered the optimization based attack by
Tong et al. [27], but it was unable to exact a noticeable
increase in MSE even at a poisoning rate of 20%. Therefore
7we do not present experimental results for it.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we describe the datasets used and other
procedures of the experimental setup. We extensively in-
vestigate how the performance of N-LID weighted regres-
sion models holds against an increasing fraction of poi-
soned training data. Our code and datasets are available
at https://github.com/sandamal/lid-regression.
6.1 Case study: risk assignment to suspicious trans-
missions
We provide here a brief description of the simulations that
were conducted to obtain the data for the case study that
we are considering in this paper. Refer to the work of
Weerasinghe et al. [33] for additional information regarding
the security application in SDR networks.
Network simulation and data collection: We use the
INET framework for OMNeT++ [34] as the network sim-
ulator, considering signal attenuation, signal interference,
background noise, and limited radio ranges in order to
conduct realistic simulations. We place the nodes (civilians,
rogue agents, and listeners) randomly within the given con-
fined area. The simulator allows control of the frequencies
and bit rates of the transmitter radios, their communication
ranges, message sending intervals, message lengths, the
sensitivity of the receivers, minimum energy detection of
receivers, among other parameters. It is assumed that all the
communications are encrypted; therefore, the listeners are
unable to access the content of the captured transmissions.
We obtain the duration of the reception, message length,
inter-arrival time (IAT), carrier frequency, bandwidth, and
bitrate as features using the data captured by the listeners.
Considering the data received by the three closest lis-
teners (using the power of the received signal) of each
transmission source, the duration, message length, and IAT
of the messages received by each listener are averaged every
five minutes, which results in 108 (12 × 3 × 3) features in
total. Adding the latter three parameters (fixed for each
transmission source) gives the full feature vector of 111
features. The response variables (i.e., the risk of being a
rogue agent) are assigned based on the positions of the data
samples in the feature space.
6.2 Benchmark datasets.
We use the following combination of relatively high di-
mensional and low dimensional regression datasets in our
experimental analysis. In particular, The House and Loan
datasets are used as benchmark datasets in the literature
[5]. Table 1 provides the training and test set sizes, the
regularization parameter λ of the ridge regression model,
and the line search learning rates η of the attacks considered
for each of the datasets.
House dataset: The dataset uses features such as year
built, floor area, number of rooms, and neighborhood to
predict the sale prices of houses. There are 275 features
in total, including the response variable. All features are
normalized into [0, 1]. We fix the training set size to 840,
and the test set size to 280.
Loan dataset: The dataset contains information regard-
ing loans made on LendingClub. Each data sample contains
89 features, including loan amount, term, the purpose of the
loan, and borrower’s attributes with the interest rate as the
response variable. We normalize the features into [0, 1] and
fix the training set and test set size as above.
Grid dataset: Arzamasov et al. [35] simulated a four-
node star electrical grid with centralized production to
predict its stability, w.r.t the behavior of participants of the
grid (i.e., generator and consumers). The system is described
with differential equations, with their variables given as fea-
tures of the dataset. In our work, we use the real component
of the characteristic equation root as the response variable
for the regression problem.
Machine dataset: The dataset by Kibler et al. [36] is used
to estimate the relative performance of computer hardware
based on attributes such as machine cycle time, memory,
cache size, and the number of channels.
TABLE 1: Description of the datasets.
Dataset
# of
features
Training
size
Test
size λ
η of
BFlip
η of
IFlip
House 274 840 280 0.0373 0.01 0.01
Loan 88 840 280 0.0273 0.05 0.05
OMNeT 111 502 125 0.0002 0.01 0.01
Grid 12 840 280 0.0173 0.01 0.30
Machine 6 125 42 0.0223 0.03 0.03
6.3 Experimental setup.
For each learning algorithm, we find its hyperparameters
using five-fold cross-validation on a pristine dataset. For
LID calculations we tune k over [10, 100) as previously
done by Ma et al. [12]. Kernel density estimation for LR
calculation was performed using a Gaussian kernel with
the bandwidth found using a cross-validation approach to
avoid overfitting. The effects of kernel density estimation are
neutralized by the smooth function fitting (Equation (11));
therefore, the algorithm is robust to these choices.
For each dataset, we create five cross-validation sets. We
present the average MSE of the cross-validation sets for
each learner when the poisoning rate increases from 0 to 20.
While increasing the poisoning rate over 20% is feasible, it is
unrealistic to expect a learner to withstand such amounts of
poisoned data, and it also assumes a powerful attacker with
significant influence over the training data. As the existence
of such an attacker is unlikely, we limit the poisoning rate
to 20%, similar to prior works in the literature.
6.4 Results and discussion.
6.4.1 Attacker unaware defense
Figure 5 compares the average MSE for the three attacker
unaware weighting schemes and the LR based weighting
scheme that we introduced in Section 4.4. Of the three
attacker unaware weighting schemes, we see that the convex
weight function has 58% lower average MSE in House, 9%
in Loan, 51% in Machine, and 47% in OMNeT. This is not
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Fig. 5: The average MSE for each weighting scheme under the two attack configurations (BFlip and IFlip) for the benchmark
datasets and the OMNeT case study.
surprising as the convex weight function is the closest to the
ideal LR based weight function. The result suggests that it is
favorable to the learner to reduce the weights of suspected
adversarial samples even if there is an increased risk of de-
emphasizing normal samples as well. This is to be expected
with linear regression data where there is high redundancy;
losing a portion of normal data from training would not sig-
nificantly impact the performance of the estimator. In future
studies, it might be possible to investigate the performance
of the three weighting functions in situations where data
redundancy is low, such as non-linear regression problems.
In the following sections, the term N-LID CVX refers to
a ridge regression model with the convex weight function
based defense.
6.4.2 In the absence of an attack
As stated in Section 5, we assume that the learner is unaware
of the attacker; therefore the training data may or may not be
manipulated by the adversary. Hence it is possible to have
a scenario where the learner utilizes a defense algorithm
when an attack is not present.
It is common for adversarial learning algorithms to sac-
rifice performance in the absence of an attack to improve
their attack resilience in the presence of attacks. Improving
attack resilience often results in decreased performance in
the absence of an attack and vice versa. However, as Figure
6 shows, all the adversarial/robust learners considered in
the experiments perform similarly to a learner with no
built-in defense when the poisoning rate is zero. This result
may be explained by the fact that there is a high level of
redundancy in the linear regression datasets. Therefore even
if a learner removes/de-emphasizes a subset of samples
during training even when there is no attack, the remaining
data samples are sufficient to obtain an accurate estimator.
6.4.3 In the presence of an attack
First, we consider the performance of the undefended ridge
learner, as shown in Figure 6. We observe that the MSE
values increase by 25.6% and 14.56% on the House dataset,
0.50% and 0.27% on the Loan dataset, 0.46% and 0.01% on
the Grid dataset, and 20.75% and 20.15% on the Machine
dataset under BFlip and IFLip Opt attacks respectively. We
observe a similar trend in the OMNeT dataset, as well. These
results suggest that (i) undefended regression learners can
be severely affected by poisoning attacks, and (ii) among the
two attack configurations considered, BFlip is more potent
than IFlip as the initial movement of the response variable
y is more aggressive compared to IFlip.
We now compare the performance of an N-LID LR
weighted ridge model and N-LID CVX weighted ridge
model against TRIM [5], RANSAC [18] and Huber [15]
under poisoning attacks. Table 2 compares their average
MSE values with the average MSE of a ridge regression
model with no defense (shown as the percentage increase
or decrease).
First, we consider the performance of the defenses on
the three datasets with a relatively large number of di-
mensions (i.e., House, Loan, and OMNeT). Considering the
experimental evidence on the performance of the robust
learners (i.e., Huber and RANSAC), we see that they are not
effective at defending against poisoning attacks when the
dimensionality of the data is high. In fact, their performance
is significantly worse than an undefended ridge regression
model. The average MSE of RANSAC is up to 61.83% higher
on the House dataset, up to 33.36% higher on the Loan
dataset and up to 61.64% higher on the OMNeT dataset
when compared with an undefended ridge model. Huber
also increases the average MSE by 99.81%, 23.93%, and
28.61%, respectively, for the three datasets. This finding
is consistent with that of Jagielski et al. [5] who reported
similar performance for robust learners when used with
high-dimensional datasets.
This behavior of Huber and RANSAC may be due to
high dimensional noise. In high dimensional spaces, poi-
soned data might not stand out due to the presence of
high dimensional noise [19], thereby impairing their perfor-
mance. Moreover, it should be noted that these defenses are
designed against stochastic noise/outliers, not adversarially
poisoned data. In an adversarial setting, a sophisticated
adversary may poison the data such that the poisoned
samples have a similar distribution to normal data, thereby,
reducing the possibility of being detected.
In contrast, TRIM, a defense that is designed against
poisoning attacks, has up to 70.43% and 1.59% lower MSE
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Fig. 6: The average MSE on the test set for each defense algorithm under the B-Flip Opt attack. The poisoning rate is
increased from 0% to 20%.
TABLE 2: The percentage increase/decrease of average MSE of each defense algorithm compared to a ridge regression
model with no defense. The best results are indicated in bold font. The rows corresponding to the defense algorithms
introduced in this work are highlighted in grey.
House Loan OMNeT Grid Machine
BFlip IFlip BFlip IFlip BFlip IFlip BFlip IFlip BFlip IFlip
N-LID LR ridge -87.27% -84.24% -7.53% -4.78% -20.53% -29.36% -4.29% -0.86% -80.64% -71.63%
N-LID CVX ridge -66.83% -67.74% -12.16% -8.55% 0.30% -3.52% -2.84% -0.13% -76.12% -76.63%
TRIM -38.13% -70.43% -1.59% -0.72% 31.76% 6.83% -6.74% -0.97% -86.24% -61.96%
RANSAC 53.26% 61.83% 33.36% 22.63% 20.36% 61.64% -5.92% -1.05% -70.24% -83.37%
Huber 99.81% 46.97% 22.22% 23.93% 28.61% 7.24% -7.18% -2.14% -35.55% -39.60%
values compared to an undefended ridge model on the
House and Loan datasets. Interestingly, on the OMNeT
dataset, we observe 31.76% and 6.8% higher MSE values
for TRIM. Readers may also notice that the prediction per-
formance of TRIM shown in [5] is different from what we
have obtained. Analyzing the provided code revealed that
in their experiments the poisoned training dataset is created
by appending the poisoned samples X¯ to the matrix X
containing the pristine samples (resulting in X˜ ∈ R(n+p)×d).
During the first iteration of TRIM, the first n rows are
selected to train the regression model, which happens to
be the pristine data in this case. To avoid this issue, in our
experiments, we randomly permute the rows of X˜ before
training with TRIM.
The N-LID based defense mechanisms consistently out-
performed the other defenses against all the attack con-
figurations on the three datasets with a large number of
dimensions. On the House dataset, N-LID LR weighted
ridge model has the best prediction performance (87.27%
lower MSE) with the N-LID CVX weighted ridge model
being closely behind (67.74% lower MSE). A similar trend
is present on the OMNeT dataset, where the N-LID LR
weighted ridge model has a 29.36% lower average MSE.
On the Loan dataset, we observe that N-LID CVX weighted
ridge model has the best performance with a 12.16% lower
average MSE. It is interesting to note that the performance
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TABLE 3: The average training time (s) as a factor of the training time of a ridge regression model with no defense. The
best results are indicated in bold font. The rows corresponding to the defense algorithms introduced in this work are
highlighted in grey.
House Loan OMNeT Grid Machine
BFlip IFlip BFlip IFlip BFlip IFlip BFlip IFlip BFlip IFlip
N-LID LR ridge 14.85 17.31 47.36 42.21 30.46 28.08 127.13 88.98 199.11 198.27
N-LID CVX ridge 11.30 12.88 33.83 30.04 22.91 19.52 86.43 60.85 9.89 9.78
TRIM 19.55 23.32 39.74 41.87 33.87 31.47 83.83 90.47 15.49 11.04
RANSAC 35.65 40.31 74.62 68.32 41.48 39.28 124.35 73.19 128.26 95.18
Huber 122.18 149.28 182.52 167.81 207.86 169.31 23.24 11.96 19.50 15.08
of the N-LID CVX weighting mechanism, which makes no
assumptions of the attack, is on par with the N-LID LR
baseline weighting scheme in the majority of the test cases
considered.
Turning now to the experimental evidence on the per-
formance of the defenses on the two datasets with a small
number of dimensions (i.e., Grid and Machine), we see
that all the defenses considered can outperform the ridge
regression learner without a defense. What stands out in
Table 2 is that the robust regression learners (Huber and
RANSAC) that performed worse than an undefended ridge
regression model on the three datasets with a large number
of dimensions, have significantly lower MSE values on the
two datasets with the smaller number of dimensions. Huber
has the best prediction performance on the Grid dataset
even exceeding the N-LID based defenses. It has up to
7.18% and 39.60% lower MSE values, respectively, for the
two datasets. The average MSE value of RANSAC is 5.92%
lower on the Grid dataset while having an 83.37% lower
MSE on the Machine dataset.
N-LID based defenses perform consistently across all
the datasets considered when compared against an unde-
fended ridge regression model. However, their performance
improvement is relatively smaller on Grid and Machine.
The lack of performance on the two datasets with a small
number of dimensions may be explained by Figure 7, which
shows the LID (not N-LID) distributions of normal and
poisoned samples in two datasets with different dimensions.
The LID estimate of a sample is the dimension of the true
low-dimensional subspace (at least approximately) in which
the particular sample lies (Section 4.1). In other words, it
describes the optimal number of features needed to explain
the salient features of the dataset. For datasets that have
a small number of features, the range of values LID could
take is also narrow (as LID is less than the actual number
of dimensions). Therefore, if the majority of the features of
a particular dataset are salient features, the resulting LID
distributions of normal and poisoned samples would have
a large overlap (Figure 7b). Overlapping LID distributions
lead to overlapping N-LID distributions, thereby impairing
the performance of LID based defenses on such datasets.
In contrast, datasets with a large number of dimensions
may allow for a wider range of LID values. In such high-
dimensional spaces poisoned and normal samples would
exhibit distinguishable LID distributions as shown in Figure
7a (unless a majority of the features are salient features as
explained above). Moreover, in such spaces where most data
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Fig. 7: The LID distribution of poisoned and normal samples
when 16% of the training data is poisoned.
points seem equidistant, the N-LID based defenses have
good performance because they characterize poisoned sam-
ples from normal samples using the true low-dimensional
manifold of the data. However, the issue of obtaining distin-
guishable LID distributions for poisoned and normal sam-
ples for datasets with a high percentage of salient features is
an intriguing one that could be usefully explored in further
research.
6.4.4 Practical implications of poisoning attacks
We now turn to the practical implications of the poisoning
attacks on the case study considered in this paper. In a
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security application such as the one discussed, having the
decision variable change by even a small amount could
have dire consequences. We observe that the BFlip attack
changes the assigned risks of 10.78% of the transmission
sources by 50% when a ridge regression model without
a defense is used (at 20% poisoning rate). This means a
transmission source that should ideally be assigned a high-
risk probability may be assigned a significantly lower risk
value or vice versa. Nearly half of all the transmission
sources (45.51%) have their assigned risks altered by at least
10%. However, the N-LID LR defense model resulted in
none of the transmission sources having their assigned risk
increased by over 10%.
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Fig. 8: The average MSE of NNR and ridge models when
the poisoning rate is increased from 0% to 20%.
6.4.5 Computational complexity
Table 3 compares the average training time (in seconds) for
the learners considered in the experiments. Because ridge
regression with no defense has the lowest training time, we
report the training times of the other algorithms as a factor
of its training time. It is apparent from this table that N-LID
CVX ridge has the lowest training time in eight of the ten
experiments considered. Its training times are only 11.30
times higher on the House dataset, 33.83 times higher on
the Loan dataset, 86.43 times higher on the Grid dataset,
9.89 times higher on the Machine dataset, and 22.91 times
higher on the OMNeT dataset. TRIM, being an iterative
method, has higher training times compared to N-LID CVX
ridge in the majority of the test cases. But its computational
complexity is significantly lower compared to RANSAC,
which is another iterative method.
Of the learners considered, Huber has the most variation
in average training time. We observe that on the three
datasets with a large number of dimensions, its training
times are up to 207.86 times higher compared to an un-
defended ridge model. But on the two datasets with a small
number of dimensions, its training times are significantly
less (with 11.96 being the lowest among all the defenses on
the Grid dataset).
The main advantage of the N-LID based methods is that
they are not iterative; the N-LID calculation, albeit expen-
sive, is only done once. Therefore they exhibit significant
savings in computation time while incurring little or no
loss in prediction accuracy. Given the results of the datasets
with a small number of dimensions (i.e., machine and grid),
the N-LID based methods also appear to be invariant to
the number of dimensions of the data, unlike the robust
regression methods we have considered.
Note that the computational complexity of N-LID would
scale poorly to the number of training data samples due
to its k-nearest neighbor based calculation. However, the
N-LID calculation can be made efficient by estimating the
LID of a particular data sample within a randomly selected
sample of the entire dataset. We refer the readers to the
work of Ma et al. [12] for further information about this
process known as minibatch sampling. Furthermore, calcu-
lating the LIDs within each minibatch can be parallelized
for improved performance.
6.4.6 Transferability of the defense
We now investigate the transferability of the proposed de-
fense by applying it to a fundamentally different learner,
neural network regression (NNR). Neural network based
regression models follow a gradient-based optimization al-
gorithm similar to Ridge regression that minimizes the MSE
between the model prediction and the correct response vari-
able [37]. The algorithm uses a linear activation function for
the output layer with a single neuron and backpropagation
to compute the gradients. The sample weight-based defense
can be used with NNR models by multiplying the loss
of each sample by its corresponding weight to increase or
decrease its importance in the optimization process.
First, we run the Opt attack against ridge regression
and obtain a poisoned dataset. Then we train an NNR
model on the poisoned data. The average MSE of the NNR
model with no defense is 25.34% higher on the House
dataset, 12.29% higher on the Loan dataset, 5.61% higher
on the OMNeT dataset, 19.11% higher on the Grid dataset,
and 46.67% lower on the Machine dataset compared to a
ridge regression model with no defense. This result may
be explained by the fact that an NNR model (which is a
nonlinear estimator) is too complex for a linear regression
problem; therefore, it overfits the perturbed training data,
resulting in poor prediction performance on an unperturbed
test set.
However, our aim is to demonstrate that our proposed
defense can be applied to different learning algorithms, not
to compare the linear ridge regression model with a NNR
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model. To that end, we observe that if the loss function of
the NNR is weighted using the N-LID LR weighting scheme
we introduce, it can maintain a near 0% increase in MSE
when the poisoning rate is increased to 20%. These findings
demonstrate the flexibility of our defense mechanism.
In summary, these results show that (i) robust learn-
ers are unable to withstand carefully crafted adversarial
attacks on datasets where the number of dimensions is
large, whereas adversarial learners can, (ii) N-LID based
defenses that de-emphasize the effects of suspected sam-
ples consistently perform better in terms of lower MSE
values and running times compared to other defenses, (iii)
although N-LID CVX makes no assumptions of the attack,
its performance is comparable to the baseline N-LID LR
defense, and (iv) the N-LID based defenses can successfully
be used in conjunction with different algorithms such as
NNR models.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper addresses the problem of increasing the attack
resistance of linear regression models against data poisoning
attacks. We observed that carefully crafted attacks could
significantly degrade the prediction performance of regres-
sion models, and robust regression models are unable to
withstand targeted adversarial attacks on datasets with a
large number of dimensions. We introduced a novel LID
measure that took into account the LID values of a data sam-
ple’s neighbors and introduced several weighting schemes
that alter each sample’s influence on the learned model.
Experimental results suggest that the proposed defense
mechanisms are quite effective and significantly outperform
prior art in terms of accuracy and computational costs.
Further research should be undertaken to investigate the
effects of poisoning attacks on non-linear regression models
and how N-LID would perform in such scenarios.
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